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A QUANTUM COMPUTATIONAL SEMANTICS FOR
EPISTEMIC LOGICAL OPERATORS.
PART II: SEMANTICS
ENRICO BELTRAMETTI, MARIA LUISA DALLA CHIARA, ROBERTO GIUNTINI,
ROBERTO LEPORINI, AND GIUSEPPE SERGIOLI
Abstract. By using the abstract structures investigated in the first
Part of this article, we develop a semantics for an epistemic language,
which expresses sentences like “Alice knows that Bob does not under-
stand that pi is irrational”. One is dealing with a holistic form of quan-
tum computational semantics, where entanglement plays a fundamental
role; thus, the meaning of a global expression determines the contextual
meanings of its parts, but generally not the other way around. The
epistemic situations represented in this semantics seem to reflect some
characteristic limitations of the real processes of acquiring information.
Since knowledge is not generally closed under logical consequence, the
unpleasant phenomenon of logical omniscience is here avoided.
1. The epistemic quantum computational syntax
The structures, investigated in the first Part of this article, provide the
mathematical basis for the development of our epistemic semantics. The
basic intuitive idea can be sketched as follows: pieces of quantum informa-
tion (qumixes) can be denoted by the sentences of a formal language, whose
logical connectives correspond to some quantum gates, while the two fun-
damental epistemic operators (to understand and to know) are interpreted
as epistemic operations living in semantic models based on convenient epis-
temic quantum computational structures. Accordingly, sentences like “At
time t Alice knows that Bob does not understand that pi is irrational” turn
out to denote particular examples of qumixes, representing possible states of
quantum objects. Let us first introduce the epistemic language that will be
used. This language, indicated by LEpQC, contains atomic sentences (say,
“the spin-value in the x-direction is up”), including two privileged sentences
t and f that represent the truth-values Truth and Falsity , respectively. We
will use q, r, . . . as metavariables for atomic sentences, and α, β, ... as
metavariables for sentences. The quantum computational connectives of
LEpQC are: the negation ¬ (which corresponds to the gate Negation), the
squareroot of the identity
√
id (which corresponds to Hadamard), a ternary
connective ⊺ (which corresponds to the Toffoli -gate), the exclusive disjunc-
tion
⊎
(which corresponds to XOR). The epistemic sub-language of LEpQC
contains: a finite set of names for epistemic agents (a, b, ...); a set of names
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(t1, t2, ...) for the elements of a given time-sequence; the epistemic operators
U (to understand) and K (to know).
For any sentences α, β, γ, the expressions ¬α,
√
id α, ⊺(α, β, γ), α
⊎
β
are sentences. For any sentence α, for any agent-name a (say, Alice), for
any time-name t, the expressions Uatα (at time t agent a understands the
sentence α) and Katα (at time t agent a knows the sentence α) are sen-
tences. Notice that nested epistemic operators are allowed: an expression
like Kat¬Ubtα is a well-formed sentence. The connectives ¬,
√
id, ⊺,
⊎
are called gate-connectives. Any subexpression Uat or Kat of an epistemic
sentence will be called an epistemic connective.
We recall that, for any truth-perspective T, the Toffoli-gate permits one
to define a reversible conjunction ANDT (for any ρ ∈ D(H(m)) and for any
σ ∈ D(H(n))):
ANDT(ρ, σ) :=
DT
(m,n,1)
T
(ρ⊗ σ ⊗ TP (1)0 ).
Accordingly, from a syntactical point of view, it is reasonable to define
(metalinguistically) the logical conjunction ∧ as follows (for any sentences
α and β):
α ∧ β := ⊺(α, β, f).
We will now introduce some syntactical notions that will be used in our
semantics.
Definition 1.1.
• α is called a gate-sentence iff either α is atomic or the principal
connective of α is a gate-connective.
• α is called an epistemic sentence iff α has the form Katβ.
Definition 1.2. (The atomic complexity of a sentence)
The atomic complexity At(α) of a sentence α is the number of occurrences
of atomic sentences in α.
For instance, At(⊺(q,q, f)) = 3. We will also indicate by α(n) a sentence
whose atomic complexity is n. The notion of atomic complexity plays an
important semantic role. As we will see, the meaning of any sentence whose
atomic complexity is n shall live in the domain D(H(n)). For this reason,
H(At(α)) (briefly indicated by Hα) will be also called the semantic space of
α.
Any sentence α can be naturally decomposed into its parts, giving rise to
a special configuration called the syntactical tree of α (indicated by STreeα).
Roughly, STreeα can be represented as a finite sequence of levels:
Levelk(α)
...
Level1(α),
where:
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• each Leveli(α) (with 1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a sequence (β1, . . . , βm) of sub-
formulas of α;
• the bottom level Level1(α) is α;
• the top level Levelk(α) is the sequence (q1, . . . ,qr), where q1, . . .qr
are the atomic occurrences in α;
• for any i (with 1 ≤ i < k), Leveli+1(α) is the sequence obtained by
dropping the principal gate-connective in all molecular gate-sentences
occurring at Leveli(α), by dropping the epistemic connectives (Uat,
Kat) in all epistemic sentences occurring at Leveli(α) and by repeat-
ing all the atomic sentences that occur at Leveli(α).
By Height of α (indicated by Height(α)) we mean the number of levels
of the syntactical tree of α.
As an example, consider the following sentence:
α = Kat¬(q ∧ ¬q) = Kat¬(⊺(q,¬q, f))
(say, “At time t Alice knows the non-contradiction principle”, instantiated
by means of the atomic sentence q).
The syntactical tree of α is the following sequence of levels:
Level5(α) = (q,q, f)
Level4(α) = (q,¬q; f)
Level3(α) = (⊺(q,¬q, f))
Level2(α) = (¬ ⊺ (q,¬q, f))
Level1(α) = (Kat¬(⊺(q,¬q, f)))
Clearly, Height(⊺(q,¬q, f)) = 5.
More precisely, the syntactical tree of a sentence (whose atomic complex-
ity is r) is defined as follows.
Definition 1.3. (The syntactical tree of α)
The syntactical tree of α is the following sequence of sentence-sequences:
STreeα = (Level1(α), . . . , Levelk(α)),
where:
• Level1(α) = α;
• Leveli+1 is defined as follows for any i such that 1 ≤ i < k. The
following cases are possible:
(1) Leveli(α) does not contain any connective. Hence, Leveli(α) =
(q1, . . . ,qr) and Height(α) = i;
(2) Leveli(α) = (β1, . . . , βm), and for at least one j, βj has a (prin-
cipal) connective. Consider the following sequence of sentence-
sequences:
∫ ′1, . . . , ∫ ′m,
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where: ∫ ′h =


(βh), if βh is atomic;
∫∗h , otherwise.Where: ∫∗h =


(δ), if βh = ¬δ or βh =
√
id δ;
(γ, δ, θ), if βh = ⊺(γ, δ, θ);
(γ, δ), if βh = γ
⊎
δ;
(δ), if βh = Uatδ or βh = Katδ.
Then,
Leveli+1(α) = ∫ ′1 • . . . • ∫ ′m,
where • represents the sequence-composition.
2. The epistemic quantum computational semantics
We will now give the basic definitions of our semantics. We will apply to
epistemic situations a holistic version of quantum computational semantics
(which has been naturally inspired by the characteristic holistic features of
the quantum theoretic formalism1). In this semantics any model assigns to
any sentence a global meaning that determines the contextual meanings of
all its parts (from the whole to the parts!). It may happen that one and the
same sentence receives different meanings in different contexts.
Before defining holistic models, we will first introduce the weaker notion
of quasi-model of the language LEpQC.
Definition 2.1. (Quasi-model)
A quasi-model of the language LEpQC is a system
Mq = (T, Ag, EpSit, den)
where:
(1) (T, Ag, EpSit) is an epistemic quantum computational structure2;
(2) den is a function that interprets the individual names of the lan-
guage. By simplicity, we put:
den(a) = a; den(t) = t.
Apparently, quasi-models represent partial interpretations of the language:
while names of times and of agents receive an interpretation in the framework
of a given epistemic situation, meanings of sentences are not determined.
In the first Part of this article we have seen that knowledge operations
cannot be generally represented as qumix gates. At the same time, once
fixed an epistemic quantum computational structure S = (T, Ag, EpSit),
one can naturally define the following notion of pseudo-gate with respect to
S.
Definition 2.2. (Pseudo-gate)
1See [1] and [3].
2See Section 3 of the first Part of this article.
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Let S = (T, Ag, EpSit) be an epistemic quantum computational structure.
A pseudo-gate of S is a operator-product
X
(n1)
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗X(nm)m ,
where any X
(ni)
i (with 1 ≤ i ≤ m) is either a qumix-gate DG(ni)T with respect
to a truth-perspective T or an epistemic operation (U
(ni)
at or K
(ni)
at ) of S.
One can show that for any choice of a truth-perspective T and of a
quasi-model Mq = (T, Ag, EpSit, den), the syntactical tree of a sentence
α uniquely determines a sequence of pseudo-gates, that will be called the
(T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree of α.
As an example, consider again the sentence
α = Kat¬(q ∧ ¬q) = Kat¬(⊺(q,¬q, f))
and its syntactical tree.
Apparently, Level4(α) is obtained from Level5(α) by repeating the first
occurrence of q, by negating the second occurrence of q and by repeating
f . Hence the pseudo-gate that corresponds to Level4(α) will be
DI(1) ⊗
DNOT
(1)
T
⊗ DI(1). Level3(α) is obtained from Level4(α) by applying to the
three sentences occurring at Level4(α) the connective ⊺. Hence the pseudo-
gate that corresponds to Level3(α) will be
DT
(1,1,1)
T
. Level2(α) is obtained
from Level3(α) by applying to the sentence occurring at Level3(α) the con-
nective ¬. Hence the pseudo-gate that corresponds to Level2(α) will be
DNOT
(3)
T
. Finally, Level1(α) is obtained from Level2(α) by applying to the
sentence occurring at Level2(α) the epistemic connective Kat. Hence the
pseudo-gate that corresponds to Level1(α) will be K
(3)
at .
On this basis, the (T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree of the sentence
α = Kat¬(q ∧ ¬q) = Kat¬(⊺(q,¬q, f))
can be identified with the following sequence consisting of four pseudo-gates:(
DI(1) ⊗ DNOT(1)
T
⊗ DI(1), DT(1,1,1)
T
, DNOT
(3)
T
, K
(3)
at
)
.
Notice that the truth-perspectives T and Tat may be different.
The general definition of (T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree is the following:
Definition 2.3. ((T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree)
Let α be a sentence such that Height(α) = k. The (T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree
of α is the sequence of peudo-gates
PsTreeαT = (
αO
(k−1)
T
, . . . , αO
(1)
T
),
that is defined as follows. Suppose that
Leveli−1(α) = (β
(r1)
1 , . . . , β
(rm)
m ),
(where 1 < i ≤ k). We put:
αO
(i−1)
T
= αX
(r1)
T
⊗ . . .⊗ αX(rm)
T
,
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where any αX
(rj)
T
is a pseudo-gate defined on H(rj) such that:
αX
(rj)
T
=


DI(rj), if β
(rj)
j is atomic;
DNOT
(rj)
T
, if β
(rj)
j = ¬δ;
D
√
I
(rj)
T
, if β
(rj)
j =
√
id δ;
DT
(u,v,w)
T
, if β
(rj)
j = ⊺(γ
(u), δ(v), θ(w));
DXOR
(u,v)
T
, if β
(rj)
j = γ
(u)
⊎
δ(v);
U
(rj)
at , if β
(rj)
j = Uatδ;
K
(rj)
at , if β
(rj)
j = Katδ.
Consider now a sentence α and let (αO
(k−1)
T
, . . . , αO
(1)
T
) be the (T,Mq)-
pseudo-gate tree of α. Any choice of a qumix ρ in Hα determines a sequence
(ρk, . . . , ρ1) of qumixes of Hα, where:
ρk = ρ
ρk−1 = αOk−1T (ρk)
...
ρ1 =
αO1T(ρ2).
The qumix ρk can be regarded as a possible input-information concerning
the atomic parts of α, while ρ1 represents the output-information about
α, given the input-information ρk. Each ρi corresponds to the information
about Leveli(α), given the input-information ρk.
How to determine an information about the parts of α under a given
input? It is natural to apply the reduced state function that determines for
any state ρ of a composite system S = S1+. . .+Sn the state Red
i1,...,im(ρ) of
any subsystem Si1 + . . .+Sim (where 1 ≤ i1 ≤ n, . . . , 1 ≤ im ≤ n.) Consider
the syntactical tree of α and suppose that:
Leveli(α) = (βi1 , . . . , βir).
We know that the (T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree of α and the choice of an input
ρk (in Hα) determine a sequence of qumixes:
ρk ! Levelk(α) = (q1, . . . ,qt)
...
ρi! Leveli(α) = (βi1 , . . . , βir )
...
ρ1 ! Level1(α) = α
We can consider Redj(ρi), the reduced information of ρi with respect to
the j-th part. From a semantic point of view, this object can be regarded
as a contextual information about βij (the subformula of α occurring at the
j-th position at Leveli(α)) under the input ρk.
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We can now define the notion of holistic model , which assigns meanings
to all sentences of the language, for any choice of a truth-perspective T.
Definition 2.4. (Holistic model)
A holistic model of the language LEpQC is a system
M = (T, Ag, EpSit, den, MHol)
where:
(1) (T, Ag, EpSit, den) is a quasi-model Mq of the language.
(2) MHol is a map that associates to any truth-perspective T a map
MHolT representing a holistic interpretation of the sentences of the
language. The following conditions are required.
(2.1) For any sentence α, the interpretation MHolT associates to each
level of the syntactical tree of α a meaning, represented by a
qumix living in Hα (the semantic space of α);
(2.2) Let (αO
(k−1)
T
, . . . , αO
(1)
T
) be the (T,Mq)-pseudo-gate tree of α
and let 1 ≤ i < Height(α). Then,
MHolT(Leveli(α)) = αO
(i)
T
(MHolT(Leveli+1(α))).
In other words the global meaning of each level (different from
the top level) is obtained by applying the corresponding pseudo-
gate to the meaning of the level that occurs immediately above.
(2.3) Let Leveli(α) = (β1, . . . , βr). Then:
βj = f ⇒ Redj(MHolT(Leveli(α))) = TP (1)0 ;
βj = t ⇒ Redj(MHolT(Leveli(α))) = TP (1)1 , for any j (1 ≤
j ≤ r).
In other words, the contextual meanings of f and of t are always
the T-Falsity and the T-Truth, respectively.
On this basis, we put:
MHolT(α) := MHolT(Level1(α)),
for any sentence α.
As an example, consider again the sentence
α = Kat¬(q ∧ ¬q) = Kat¬(⊺(q,¬q, f)).
As we have seen, any (T,Mq)-pseudo-gate-tree of α will have the following
form: (
DI(1) ⊗ DNOT(1)
T
⊗ DI(1), DT(1,1,1)
T
, DNOT
(3)
T
, K
(3)
at
)
.
Take a model
M = (T, Ag, EpSit, den, MHol)
such that:
• MHolI(LevelHeight(α)(α) = MHolI((q,q, f)) = P|ψ〉˘,
where |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ⊗ |0〉.
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• EpSit assigns to agent at the epistemic situation
(Tat , EpDat , Uat , Kat),
where EpDat = D and Kat(ρ) = ρ, for any ρ ∈ D. In other words,
at has a maximal epistemic capacity
3.
We obtain:
MHolI(Kat¬(q ∧ ¬q)) = P|ϕ〉, where:
|ϕ〉 = K(3)at NOT(3)I T(1,1,1)I (I(1) ⊗ NOT(1)I ⊗ I(1))( 1√2(|0〉 + |1〉) ⊗
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ⊗
|0〉) = 12(|0, 1, 1〉+ |0, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0〉+ |1, 0, 1〉).
Hence, pI(
MHolI(Kat¬(q ∧ ¬q))) = 34 6= 1.
This example clearly shows how even an agent with a maximal epistemic ca-
pacity does not necessarily know a very simple instance of the non-contradiction
principle!
Unlike standard compositional semantics, any MHolT(α) represents a
kind of autonomous semantic context that is not necessarily correlated with
the meanings of other sentences. At the same time, given a sentence γ,
MHolT determines the contextual meaning, with respect to the context
MHolT(γ), of any occurrence of a subformula β in the syntactical tree of
γ.
Definition 2.5. (Contextual meaning)
Consider a sentence γ such that
Leveli(γ) = (βi1 , . . . , βir).
The contextual meaning of the occurrence βij with respect to the context
MHolT(γ) is defined as follows:
MHolγ
T
(βij ) := Red
j(MHolT(Leveli(γ))).
Hence, in particular, we have for any sentence γ
MHolγ
T
(γ) = MHolT(Level1(γ)) = MHolT(γ).
Generally, different occurrences βij and βhk of one and the same subfor-
mula β in the syntactical tree of γ may receive different contextual meanings.
In other words, we may have:
MHolγ
T
(βij ) 6= MHolγT(βhk).
When this is not the case, we will say that one is dealing with a normal
model.
Definition 2.6. (Normal holistic model)
A normal holistic model of the language LEpQC is a holistic model M such
that for any truth-perspective T and for any sentence γ, the interpretation
MHolT determines for any occurrence βij of a subformula β of γ in the
syntactical tree of γ the same contextual meaning, which will be uniformly
indicated by MHolγ
T
(β).
3See Section 3 of the first Part of this article.
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In the following we will always refer to normal holistic models.
Suppose that β is a subformula of two different formulas γ and δ. Gener-
ally, we have:
MHolγ
T
(β) 6= MHolδT(β).
In other words, sentences may receive different contextual meanings in
different contexts also in the case of the normal holistic semantics.
To what extent do contextual meanings and gates (associated to the log-
ical connectives) commute? An answer to this question is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Consider a holistic model M = (T, Ag, EpSit, den, MHol)
and a truth-perspective T.
1. Let ¬α be a subformula of γ. Suppose that ¬α = βij (the formula
occurring at the j-th position of the i-th level in the syntactical tree
of γ), while α = β(i+1)k . We have:
MHolγ
T
(¬α) = Redj(MHolT(Leveli(γ))) =
DNOT
(At(α))
T
(Redk(MHolT(Leveli+1(γ)))) =
DNOT
(At(α))
T
(MHolγ
T
(α)).
2. Let
√
idα be a subformula of γ. Suppose that
√
idα = βij , while
α = β(i+1)k . We have:
MHolγ
T
(
√
idα) = Redj(MHolT(Leveli(γ))) =
D
√
I
(At(α))
T (Red
k(MHolT(Leveli+1(γ)))) =
D
√
I
(At(α))
T (
MHolγ
T
(α)).
3. Let ⊺(α1, α2, α3) be a subformula of γ. Suppose that in the syntactical
tree of γ: ⊺(α1, α2, α3) = βij , while α1 = β(i+1)k1
, α2 = β(i+1)k2
,
α3 = β(i+1)k3 We have:MHolγ
T
(⊺(α1, α2, α3)) = Red
j(MHolT(Leveli(γ))) =
DT
(At(α1),At(α2),At(α3))
T
(Redk1,k2,k3(MHolT(Leveli+1(γ)))).
4. Let α1⊎α2 be a subformula of γ. Suppose that in the syntactical tree
of γ: α1 ⊎ α2) = βij , while α1 = β(i+1)k1 , α2 = β(i+1)k2 . We have:MHolγ
T
(α1 ⊎ α2) = Redj(MHolT(Leveli(γ))) =
DXOR
(At(α1),At(α2))
T
(Redk1,k2(MHolT(Leveli+1(γ)))).
5. Let Uatα be a subformula of γ. Suppose that Uatα = βij , while
α = β(i+1)k . We have:
MHolγ
T
(Uatα) = Redj(MHolT(Leveli(γ))) =
U
(At(α))
at (Red
k(MHolT(Leveli+1(γ)))) = U
(At(α))
at (
MHolγ
T
(α)).
6. Let Katα be a subformula of γ. Suppose that Katα = βij , while
α = β(i+1)k . We have:
MHolγ
T
(Katα) = Redj(MHolT(Leveli(γ))) =
K
(At(α))
at (Red
k(MHolT(Leveli+1(γ)))) = K
(At(α))
at (
MHolγ
T
(α)).
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Proof. By definition of syntactical tree, of pseudo-gate tree, of normal holis-
tic model and of contextual meaning.

Notice that, generally, the contextual meaning of a conjunction is not the
conjunction of the contextual meanings of the two members. As a coun-
terexample, consider the following contradictory sentence:
γ = q ∧ ¬q = ⊺(q,¬q, f),
whose syntactical tree is:
Level3(γ) = (q,q, f)
Level2(γ) = (q,¬q, f)
Level1(γ) = ⊺(q,¬q, f)
Consider a model M such that:
MHolI(Level3(γ)) = P 1√
2
(|0,1,0〉+|1,0,0〉)
(which is a maximally entangled quregister with respect to the first and to
the second part4). Hence:
MHolI(Level1(γ)) = MHolI(γ) = MHol
γ
I
(γ) = P 1√
2
(|0,0,0〉+|1,1,1〉)
(which is a maximally entangled quregister). At the same time, we have:
MHolγ
I
(q) = MHolγ
I
(¬q) = 1
2
P
(1)
0 +
1
2
P
(1)
1 ,
which is a proper mixture. Consequently:
DT(1,1,1)(MHolγ
I
(q)⊗ MHolγ
I
(¬q)⊗ MHolγ
I
(f)) 6= MHolγ
I
(⊺(q,¬q, f)).
Notice that: pI(
MHolγ
I
(q ∧ ¬q)) = 12 ; while:
pI(
DT(1,1,1,)(MHolγ
I
(q)⊗ MHolγ
I
(¬q)⊗ MHolγ
I
(f))) = 14 .
Definition 2.7. (Harmonic and sound models)
Let M = (T, Ag, EpSit, den, MHol) be a model.
• M is called harmonic iff the epistemic structure of M is harmonic,
i.e. all agents of the structure share the same truth-perspective T.
Furthermore, the interpretation-function MHol is only defined for
the truth-perspective T.
• M is called sound iff all agents at of M have a sound epistemic
capacity (i.e. assign the “right” probability-values to the truth-values
of their truth-perspectives).5
By harmonic epistemic quantum computational semantics (sound epis-
temic quantum computational semantics) we will mean the semantics that
only refers to harmonic models (sound models).
We can now define the notions of truth, validity and logical consequence.
4See Section 2 of the first Part of this article.
5See Section 3 of the first Part of this article.
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Definition 2.8. (Contextual truth)
Let α be a subformula of γ.
(γ,M,T) α (the sentence α is true with respect to the context γ, the model
M and the truth-perspective T) iff pT(MHolγT(α)) = 1.
Definition 2.9. (Truth)
(M,T) α (the sentence α is true with respect to the model M and the truth-
perspective T) iff (α,M,T) α.
Hence, the concept of truth turns out to be a special case of the concept
of contextual truth.
Definition 2.10. (Contextual validity)
Let α be a subformula of γ.
• (γ,T) α (the sentence α is valid with respect to the context γ and the
truth-perspective T) iff for any model M, (γ,M,T) α.
• γ α (the sentence α is valid with respect to the context γ) iff for
any truth- perspective T, (γ,T) α.
Definition 2.11. (Validity)
• T α (the sentence α is valid with respect to the truth-perspective T)
iff (α,T) α.
•  α (the sentence α is valid) iff α α.
Definition 2.12. (Consequence with respect to a quasi-model Mq)
Let γ be a sentence such that α and β are subformulas of γ and let T be a
truth-perspective.
• α (γ,Mq,T) β (the sentence β is a consequence of the sentence α
with respect to the context γ, the quasi-model Mq and the truth-
perspective T) iff for any model M based on Mq:
(γ,M,T) α ⇒ (γ,M,T) β.
• α (γ,Mq) β (the sentence β is a consequence of the sentence α with
respect to the context γ and the quasi-model Mq) iff for any truth-
perspective T, α (γ,Mq,T) β.
Definition 2.13. Logical consequence
Let γ be a sentence such that α and β are subformulas of γ and let T be a
truth-perspective.
• α (γ,T) β (β is a logical consequence of α with respect to the
context γ and the truth-perspective T) iff for any quasi-model Mq,
α (γ,Mq,T) β.
• α γ β (β is a logical consequence of α with respect to the context
γ) iff for any truth-perspective T, α (γ,T) β.
• α  β (β is a logical consequence of α iff for any context γ such that
α and β are subformulas of γ and α γ β.
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The concepts of consequence and of logical consequence, defined above,
correspond to weak concepts, being defined in terms of T-Truth, and not in
terms of the preorder relation T (as one could expect). From an intuitive
point of view, however, such weak notions turn out to be more interesting
in the case of epistemic situations described in the framework of a holistic
semantics.
Notice that only the contextual notion of logical consequence turns out
to satisfy transitivity (α γ β and β γ δ ⇒ α γ δ). Full transitivity
(α  β and β  δ ⇒ α  δ) is naturally violated in the holistic semantics.
As expected, in the particular case of the harmonic epistemic semantics
(where all agents share the same truth-perspective) the definitions of truth,
validity and logical consequence can be simplified, since the reference to T
is no longer necessary. Accordingly, in such a case we will write:
Harm(γ,M) α; 
Harm
M α (harmonic truth);
Harmγ α; 
Harm α (harmonic validity);
α Harm(γ,Mq) β; α 
Harm
γ β; α 
Harm β (harmonic logical consequence).
3. Some epistemic situations
We will now illustrate some significant examples of epistemic situations
that arise in this semantics. We will always refer to models
M = (T, Ag, EpSit, den, MHol)
such that den(a) = a; den(t) = t.
1) Katα Harm α.
In the harmonic semantics, sentences that are known by a given
agent at a given time are true.
1) is an immediate consequence of the definition of logical conse-
quence and of Theorem 2.1.
2) As a particular case of 1) we obtain:
KatαKatα Harm Katα.
Knowing of knowing implies knowing. But not the other way around!
3) In the non-harmonic semantics only the two following conditions
(which are weaker than 1) and 2)) hold for any quasi-modelMq and
any agent at of Mq:
3.1) Katα (Mq,Tat ) α;
3.2) KatαKatα (Mq,Tat) Katα.
4) KatKbtα Harm α.
In the harmonic semantics, knowing that another agent knows a
given sentence implies that the sentence in question holds. At the
same time, we will have:
KatKbtα 2Harm Katα.
Alice might know that Bob knows a given sentence, without knowing
herself the sentence in question!
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5) In the harmonic sound semantics (where for any agent at,Kat
TatP
(1)
1 =
TatP
(1)
1 and Kat
TatP
(1)
0 =
TatP
(1)
0 ) we have:
Harm Katt; Harm Kat¬f .
Hence, there are sentences that every agent knows.
6) Kat(α ∧ β) 2 Katα; Kat(α ∧ β) 2 Katβ.
Knowing a conjunction does not generally imply knowing its mem-
bers.
7) (γ,M) Katα and (γ,M) Katβ ; (γ,M) Kat(α ∧ β).
Knowledge is not generally closed under conjunction.
8) Let M be a model and let at be an agent of M.
2(M,Tat) Kat(α ∧ ¬α).
Contradictions are never known.
In order to prove 8), suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a
model M and an agent at such that: (M,Tat ) Kat(α ∧ ¬α).
Then, pTat (
MHolTat (Kat(α ∧ ¬α))) = 1.
By definition of model and by Theorem 2.1 we have:
MHolTat (Kat(α ∧ ¬α)) = Kat(MHolTat (α ∧ ¬α)).
Consequently, by hypothesis, pTat (Kat(
MHolTat (α ∧ ¬α))) = 1.
Thus, by the properties of knowledge operations:
pTat (
MHolTat (α ∧ ¬α)) = 1, which is impossible, owing to the fol-
lowing Lemma (of the holistic semantics).
Lemma 3.1. For any sentence α, for any truth-perspective T and
for any holistic model M,
pT(
MHolT(α ∧ ¬α)) 6= 1.
9) In the non-harmonic semantics the following situation is possible:
(M,Tat) KatKbtf .
In other words, according to the truth-perspective of Alice it is true
that Alice (at time t) knows that Bob (at time t) knows the Falsity
of Alice’s truth-perspective.
As an example, consider a (non-harmonic) modelM with two agents
at and bt satisfying the following conditions:
a) the epistemic distance between the truth-perspectives of at and
of bt is greater than or equal to
1
2 .
6 In such a case we have:
TatP
(1)
1 Tbt TatP
(1)
0
(according to Bob’s truth-perspective, Alice’ s Truth precedes
Alice’s Falsity);
b) Kbt
TatP
(1)
0 =
TatP
(1)
1
(the information according to which Bob knows Alice’s Falsity
is true with respect to Alice’s truth-perspective);
6The concept of epistemic distance has been defined in Section 2 of the first Part of
this article.
14 BELTRAMETTI, DALLA CHIARA, GIUNTINI, LEPORINI, AND SERGIOLI
c) Kat
TatP
(1)
1 =
TatP
(1)
1
(Alice at time t has a sound epistemic capacity).
Consider the syntactical tree of KatKbtf :
Level3(KatKbtf) = f
Level2(KatKbtf) = Kbtf
Level1(KatKbtf) = KatKbtf
The qumixes assigned by MHolTat to the levels of this tree are:
MHolTat (Level3(KatKbtf)) = TatP
(1)
0
(by definition of model);
MHolTat (Level2(KatKbtf)) = Kbt(MHolTat (Level3(KatKbtf)) = TatP
(1)
1
(by definition of model and by b));
MHolTat (Level1(KatKbtf)) = Kbt(MHolTat (Level2(KatKbtf)) = TatP
(1)
1
(by definition of model and by c)).
Hence, pTat (
MHolTat (KatKbtf)) = 1 and (M,Tat) KatKbtf .
Notice that
(M,Tat) KatKbtf ; (M,Tbt) Kbtf .
In other words, the following situation is possible:
• According to Alice’s truth-perspective, it is true that Alice
knows that Bob knows the Falsity.
• However, according to Bob’s truth-perspective it is not true that
Bob knows the Falsity.
Roughly, we might say: Alice knows that Bob is wrong. However,
Bob is not aware of being wrong!
The epistemic situations illustrated above seem to reflect pretty well some
characteristic limitations of the real processes of acquiring information and
knowledge. Owing to the limits of epistemic domains, understanding and
knowing are not generally closed under logical consequence. Hence, the un-
pleasant phenomenon of logical omniscience is here avoided. We have, in
particular, that knowledge is not generally closed under logical conjunction,
as in fact happens in the case of concrete memories both of human and
of artificial intelligence. It is also admitted that an agent can understand
(or know) a conjunction, without being able to understand (to know) its
members. Such situation, which might appear prima facie somewhat “ir-
rational”, seems to be instead deeply in agreement with our use of natural
languages, where sometimes agents show to use correctly and to understand
some global expressions without being able to understand their (meaningful)
parts.
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